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Abstract
This paper deals with privacy-preserving (pseudonymized) access to a service resource. In such a scenario,
two opposite needs seem to emerge. On one side, the service provider may want to control in ﬁrst place
the user accessing its resources, i.e., without being forced to delegate the management of access permissions
to third parties to meet privacy requirements. On the other side, it should be technically possible to
trace back the real identity of an user upon dishonest behavior, and of course this must be necessary
accomplished by an external authority distinct from the provider itself. The framework described in this
paper aims at coping with these two opposite needs. This is accomplished through i) a distributed third-
party-based instrastructure devised to assign and manage pseudonym certiﬁcates, decoupled from ii) a two-
party procedure, devised to bind an authorization permission to a pseudonym certiﬁcate with no third-party
involvement. The latter procedure is based on a novel blind signature approach which allows the provider to
blindly verify, at registration time, that the user possesses the private key of the still undisclosed pseudonym
certiﬁcate, thus avoiding transferability of the authorization permission.
Keywords: Privacy, Trust management, Pseudonym system, Blind Signature
1 Introduction
Traditional Authentication and Authorization services take into little considera-
tion the protection of the user’s privacy. For instance, most of the currently de-
ployed AAA (Authentication, Authorization and Accounting) functions are man-
aged through a (logically) single AAA server such as Radius [1] or Diameter [2] which
univocally refers to the real user identity. However, disclosure of the user identity
is, in general, not strictly necessary for the service provision. As widely discussed in
literature work [3,4,5,6], service authorization may in fact be conveniently based on
the proof that the user possesses some “rights” (e.g. credentials, certiﬁcates, money
availability, etc) which guarantee her permission to access the service meanwhile
retaining anonymity. Despite the great scientiﬁc interest in privacy-preserving ap-
proaches, to date only a limited eﬀort has been spent to adapt such approaches to
operate with existing and widely deployed standards (see e.g. [7] for a standard-
based approach relying on X.509 Attribute Certiﬁcates).
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Real world application of privacy-preserving techniques has to further face the
important fact that fully anonymous access (as provided by techniques such as
ring signatures [8,9,10] or some usage of zero-knowledge approaches [11]) is not a
viable solution. For accounting or service control/enforcement/revocation purposes,
it is convenient to have technical ways to link the authorization credentials to a
single - although undisclosed - user, e.g., by having an explicit label (namely, a
pseudonym) associated to the user herself. Even more important, social security
reasons, regulatory provisions, or even simple business convenience, mandate for
the technical possibility to trace back the real user identity, e.g when a dishonest
behavior is detected or when law/security authorities require so 1 . Clearly, the
ability to revoke anonymity must be delegated to third party entities, to guarantee
the users that the service provider is not able to violate their privacy in ordinary
conditions. Indeed, most of the pseudonym and Identity Escrow systems proposed
in the literature [12,13,14] base their operation on a single, trusted, third party.
Conversely, the involvement of third parties in an authorization system not only
is not functionally necessary, but may also be considered as counter-productive. In
fact, a provider typically wants to have direct control on the access permissions
issued to its own users: delegation of such a business-critical feature to an external
party, not directly involved in the service provider business, may be in practice
considered a too high price to pay for “just” respecting the user’s privacy. However,
designing an anonymous authorization system which does not make use of third par-
ties appears a hard task, especially when non-transferability of the access credentials
is required. And in fact, to the best of our knowledge, basically all the most known
anonymous authorization and credential-based frameworks [15,16,17,18,7] rely on a
complex infrastructure involving trusted third parties.
The system described in this paper is part of a currently under development
framework, called SPARTA (Secure Pseudonym Architecture with Real Time Ac-
counting 2 ). The SPARTA framework aims at coping with the opposite needs, in
terms of third party involvement, of the pseudonymization and authorization func-
tions.
The infrastructure in charge to assign and revert pseudonyms is reduced to
a simple distributed infrastructure whose only goal is to provide valid pseudonym
certiﬁcates. This allows us to rely on widely accepted and standard-based certiﬁcate
formats (X.509), and on the eﬃcient and mature means to handle them in a PKI
(Public Key Infrastructure). The proposed approach is distributed and user-centric,
meaning that the user has the freedom to decide which, and how many, entities
composing the infrastructure will be involved in her assigned pseudonyms (possibly
multiple). While no single entity involved in a pseudonym assignment is capable
1 Note that restricting the triggering of a pseudonym reversion operation to the occurrence of one among
a clearly speciﬁed set of technical events might be overly restrictive in terms of real-world applicability,
as law provisions might not be readily expressed into precise technical statements (e.g. through a formal
policy language).
2 Our SPARTA framework is being developed in the frame of the EU funded IST Project DISCREET,
contract number 027679. As the acronym implies, we indeed aim at further extending the system hereafter
described with privacy-preserving accounting and billing functionalities. The speciﬁcation of these supple-
mentary functionalities is, to date, preliminary and object of ongoing research work (and as such outside
the goals of this present paper).
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to trace the user, the system retains the possibility to determine the real identity
behind a pseudonym through explicit interoperation (e.g., triggered by an authority)
among all the entities involved in its assignment. In other words, rather than being
forced to trust a speciﬁc and single third party, the user needs only to trust that
two or more entities selected by the user herself will not collude against her privacy
rights.
The authorization function consists in binding a speciﬁc service provider signa-
ture to the pseudonym that later on will be used to access a resource. Diﬀerent
privileges are provided by having distinct signatures for each diﬀerent resource and
access permission level. The service provider signature is performed at registration
time through a blind approach (to prevent disclosure of the pseudonym used later
on) involving only the service provider and the end user. To avoid transferability
of the pseudonym signature (and in particular to avoid pseudonym hijiacking, i.e.
having an user submitting for service provider signature another user’s pseudonym),
an innovative “marked” blind signature approach is introduced, to include veriﬁ-
cation of possession of the pseudonym certiﬁcate private key inside the signature
itself, i.e., at registration time.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the basic
ideas behind the proposed system. Section 3 details the distributed pseudonym
assignment infrastructure and its design as a PKI. Section 4 describes the cryp-
tographic details of the novel “marked” blind signature solution proposed to issue
authorization permissions. Section 5 discusses implementation issues and deploy-
ment assumptions concerning the lower layer security primitives. Conclusions are
drawn in section 6.
2 Scenario and Basic concepts
The reference scenario considered in this paper is the following. We assume that an
user is provided with an identity certiﬁcate U , for instance released at an initial oﬀ-
line “subscription” time by a service provider SP in the form of a standard X.509v3
certiﬁcate 3 . We further assume that there is a subsequent oﬀ-line “registration”
time where the user presents herself with her real identity U to the service provider
SP , and agrees to access a service/resource S. We include the type of access in the
deﬁnition of S, meaning that if a same physical resource or service may be accessed
with diﬀerent privilege levels, we treat these diﬀerent cases as diﬀerent services
S. This agreement may be further based on supplementary information eventually
presented by the user at registration time, as well as procedures, such as payment
of a ﬂat fare, performed (or documented) at registration time. No anonymity or
privacy protection is provided, in our framework, for data presented during this
phase.
3 We remark that the extension to federated identity management systems, e.g. Liberty Alliance [19] is
conceptually straightforward - the diﬀerence being that in such case a further indirection exists between
the provider that oﬀers the service, which we referred to as SP , and the central entity that manages the
user identity. In the provided description, for ease of presentation, we non restrictively assume coincidence
between these two entities.
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During such registration phase, the user will receive one or more authorization
permissions through which she will be able to access S at later times. An autho-
rization permission consists in having the SP signing, with a signature key speciﬁc
for each service or resource S, a pseudonym certiﬁcate blindly submitted to the
SP (pseudonym authorization). As such, an authorization permission is account-
able, i.e. reuse of a same access permission implies reuse of the same authorized
pseudonym. Clearly, the user may prevent linkability by asking the SP to authorize
more than one pseudonym during registration phase, and then change pseudonyms,
among the authorized ones, through diﬀerent access sessions.
To be valid, a pseudonym certiﬁcate must be released by a third party certi-
ﬁcation authority (referred to as Identity Repository in section 3), trusted by the
SP . The SP may also require the users to access S with a pseudonym certiﬁcate
satisfying speciﬁc policies (e.g., expiration date, state in which it is released, etc). It
is up to the user to submit, at registration time, a valid pseudonym, as its validity
cannot be checked at registration time (being the pseudonym blindly submitted),
but will be at access time and a non valid pseudonym will not be granted access.
An important point characterizing our proposal is that the pseudonym validity,
which is delegated to the proper operation of the PKI-like infrastructure described
in section 3, is clearly decoupled from the authorization permission, which is in-
dependently issued by the SP and binded to the pseudonym. A valid pseudonym
simply guarantees that the user identity may be traced back from the pseudonym
(through a procedure involving the PKI) if regulatory provisions or security reasons
require to do so. But it is important to remark that the SP remains independently
capable to revoke the access permission when a previously authorized pseudonym
is used in a dishonest way (this being trivial as the subsequent accesses performed
with a speciﬁc pseudonym are accountable).
2.1 Why a new blind signature?
If applied in the above described scenario, traditional blind signatures (e.g., that
ﬁrst proposed in [20]) would fail to meet the important requirement of providing
non-transferability of an authorized pseudonym. The problem, which we refer to
as “Pseudonym Hijiacking”, is that the user U , during the registration time, may
deliver the SP a pseudonym certiﬁcate P ′ of another user U ′, and have it blindly
signed for authorization. Note that the other user would only need to give U the
pseudonym certiﬁcate P ′ for its blind signature, and not the corresponding private
key, thus remaining the only one able to actually use the certiﬁcate P ′. More
advanced blind signatures, such as the Fair Blind Signatures ﬁrst proposed in [21],
may be integrated in a comprehensive authorization framework, as the one proposed
in [7] which indeed solves these problems, but require to deploy an elaborated
operation involving third party entities (such as [7]’s Attribute Authorities/Sub-
Authorities) to support the SP for authorization tasks. Similarly, group signatures
[22] would again guarantee non-transferability, but would require a third party
veriﬁer, which is something that we are trying to avoid.
Conversely, we remark that it would be possible to trivially solve the pseudonym
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non-transferability issue, meanwhile retaining the above described two-party autho-
rization framework, by devising a blind signature which integrates, in its operation
performed at registration time, an explicit proof of possession of the pseudonym’s
private key. This in fact would prevent pseudonym hijiacking as it would be neces-
sary, for an hijiacker, not only to provide the user with the pseudonym certiﬁcate
P ′, but also its private key (i.e., giving away the pseudonym). Note that the user
U would now be in the perfect condition for abusing of the the pseudonym P ′:
dishonest behavior would be in fact accounted to P ′, and hence linked to the user
U ′!
As thoroughly described in section 4, we have provided pseudonym non-
transferability by designing a novel blind signature handshake which generates a
random value R, unforgeable by both the user and the service provider, and which
remains unknown to the SP (while it will be ultimately revealed to the user at the
end of the handshake, as this value needs to be submitted later on at veriﬁcation
time). R can be hence used as random challenge, to execute what we descrip-
tively refer to as Delayed Pseudonym Certiﬁcate Veriﬁcation. The idea is to ask the
user, at registration time, to prove possession of the private key of the pseudonym
certiﬁcate P through a signature taken over a message f(R,P ), and wrap this sig-
nature inside the blind message which will be signed by the SP . Veriﬁcation of
the pseudonym signature will occur later on when the access permission will be ex-
posed (hence the “delayed” veriﬁcation feature) and in conjunction with the access
permission veriﬁcation.
To the best of our knowledge, ours is the ﬁrst blind signature approach which
integrates inside the signed message an unknown and unforgeable random value,
which may be thought as a “mark” of the act of blind signing. Hence the name
“marked blind signature”.
3 Pseudonym Assignment
The procedure to assign a pseudonym certiﬁcate P to an user is done oﬄine, i.e.
before the actual access to the service, and as such does not add extra time and/or
and/or computational burden to the service provision. Since a pseudonym P shall be
submitted by the user at registration time (see section 2), the pseudonym assignment
procedure is performed after the real identity certiﬁcate U is issued and before the
registration time.
Consistently with the scenario described in section 2, we assume that the identity
certiﬁcate U , representing the real identity of the user, is issued by the SP at
subscription time. In addition to the certiﬁcate U , still at subscription time, the
SP further releases 4 a “token” certiﬁcate T0. This certiﬁcate is an alias for the
real user identity U , and it is generated 5 so that any other entity besides the SP
4 For security reasons and performance/implementation convenience - see further considerations in section 5
-, the private/public key pairs for T0, as well as for all the subsequent certiﬁcates, are generated by the end
user. The certiﬁcate issuing procedure for T0 is therefore a simpliﬁed version of that illustrated later on for
the more general IR case.
5 While the rule to compute the token certiﬁcate T0 is in most generality left to the SP , and in principle
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should not be able to determine U from T0. Instead, the SP will keep locally track
of the mapping between U and T0.
The U → T0 mapping provides a ﬁrst level of indirection for the real user
identity U . Now, the idea is to proceed with such an indirection and derive an user
pseudonym by simply involving supplementary entities. Each intermediate entity
acts as a Certiﬁcation Authority (CA), devised to i) receive, as input, a valid token
certiﬁcate, ii) return, as output, another valid certiﬁcate, and iii) keep track of the
input-output certiﬁcate mapping. This indirection mechanism is provided through
completely standard PKI primitives and their oﬀ-the-shelf crypto mechanisms.
To this purpose, after having received the token certiﬁcate T0, the user chooses
one of such entities, hereafter referred to as Identity Repositories (IR), and submits
T0. Note that the IR is not able to determine the identity of the user from T0,
but can only verify that T0 is a valid certiﬁcate, and speciﬁcally that it is issued
by a valid CA, in this ﬁrst case the SP itself. In return, the user receives a new
token certiﬁcate T1 signed by the chosen IR. This process can be either i) iterated
through a chain of IRs, or ii) parallelized, by having the user submitting the initial
T0 more than once and receive in response multiple tokens.
In details, at any generic i-th step, the following same procedure is adopted
(we assume that the communication channel is secured and the peers authenticated
through a lower layer mechanism - e.g., IPsec or TLS, see discussion in section 5
-, to oﬄoad the procedure from supplementary security mechanisms not strictly
functional for the envisioned operation, and added only to protect from e.g., eaves-
dropping and MITM attacks):
User → IRi : {Ti−1, ei} (1)
IRi : verify signature(Ti−1) (2)
IRi ↔ User : challenge(Ti−1) (3)
IRi : policy check(Ti−1) (4)
IRi → User : Ti (5)
In this straightforward handshake, at step (1) the user generates a pair of pub-
lic/private keys, and sends the IR the certiﬁcate (token) currently owned (namely
Ti−1 to point out that this is the token achieved at step i−1), plus the public key ei
to be included in the next token Ti. The IR duly veriﬁes (step 2) that the certiﬁcate
was issued by a valid certiﬁcation authority (IR or SP ), and veriﬁes that the user
possesses the certiﬁcate private key through signature of a random challenge (step
3). Further policy controls on the certiﬁcate (state, associated permissions, expira-
tion time, etc - some additional remarks are provided at the end of this section) are
a random generation of T0 would be appropriate, for practical application it may be convenient to provide
a ﬁxed rule which limits the SP to the possibility of generating a unique T0 value for each user. This may
be for instance accomplished having T0 = U∗ where U∗ is a certiﬁcate containing an encrypted version
of the user identity. A possible reason for such a practical limitation may be the fact that, in a scenario
involving several small SP s, they may not be considered equivalent, in terms of trust level, to the other IR
certiﬁcation authorities deployed in the system. As such, a rule that prevents the possibility for an SP to
generate multiple tokens per each user may be appropriate.
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then carried out. Finally, if all checks are successful, the IR embeds the provided
public key ei into a new token certiﬁcate Ti. As ﬁnal pseudonym P , the user simply
choses the last token in this chain (where we stress that such chain is freely decided
by the user).
Neglecting for the time being security attacks, the identity of a user can be
reconstructed if and only if the initial SP and all the subsequent IRs chosen by
the user explicitly interact to revert back the input-output certiﬁcate mapping.
Through this proposed operation we thus avoid that a single entity alone (e.g. one
of the IR or the SP ) shall be capable of reverting the user pseudonym and linking
it back to the real user identity. Meanwhile we guarantee the technical possibility
to revert the assigned pseudonym through explicit interaction between the IRs and
the SP .
Despite its extreme simplicity, this approach is indeed eﬀective and may be
extended to give raise to a full-ﬂedged Identity Management PKI driven by the
user decisions. In fact, it is up to the user to decide which IRs to use, and whether
to use a single IR or a multiplicity (for improved robustness of the reversion of this
process). This makes all the framework strongly user centric.
In parallel, the set of deployed IRs form a PKI infrastructure. This means
that the IR must maintain a list of trusted CAs (both IRs and SPs), and accept
certiﬁcates issued by other CAs depending on deployed policies (regulatory, etc).
For instance, this allows the user to derive tokens (pseudonyms) from a chain of
IRs involving diﬀerent administrative domains or even states, which they may be
later on accepted as valid by the SP depending on the speciﬁcally issued service
(in other words, for some services it is possible to impose that the pseudonym must
be issued by a subset of IRs - e.g. from a same state). We point out that the
choice of obtaining a pseudonym through a given chain of SP/IRs clearly aﬀects
the regulatory conditions under which the pseudonym may be reverted. For a trivial
example, the fact that a pseudonym has been obtained by chaining two IRs from
two diﬀerent states means that the authority capable of reverting it must be a
trans-national one.
As shown in the next section, the revocation of an authorization permission for
a single misbehaving pseudonym is locally managed by the SP itself. In fact we will
show that an authorization permission is a credential issued by the SP only, with
no involvement of the described pseudonym PKI. A more elaborated problem is the
revocation of all the pseudonyms associated to a same real user identity. This can
be accomplished in a distributed way by the PKI components through the usual
revocation approaches (management of Certiﬁcate Revocation Lists). Particularly,
each IR server shall periodically check that its issued certiﬁcates are not included
in the CRL. If an issued certiﬁcate is found to be revoked, we can take advantage of
the mapping internally hold by the IR, and accelerate the pseudonym revocation
procedure by selectively informing the parent IR in the chain.
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4 Authorization Permission Assignment
As discussed in section 2, traditional blind signatures applied to our scenario suﬀer
of the pseudonym hijiacking problem. To avoid this problem, we have devised a
novel blind signature which allows to include, at the time of signature, a proof of
possession of the private key of the pseudonym P to be used later on.
4.1 Marked Blind Signature
The proposed protocol is delevoped for RSA blind signatures. It operates by explic-
itly including a “mark”, i.e., an unknown and unforgeable random value R, inside
the signed message. This random mark is then exploited as challenge to verify pos-
session of the pseudonym certiﬁcate private key. The following notation is hereafter
used:
• P : pseudonym certiﬁcate, with RSA public key = ep, private key = dp and
modulo np;
• S: service authorization certiﬁcate, with RSA public key = e, private key = d
and modulo n with the assumption n > np;
• a: DL-strong base [23] for n, generated by the Service Provider.
• x, s ∈ Z∗n: random number generated by the user, with the further limitations
discussed in the next deﬁnition of R;
• y ∈ Z∗n: random number generated by the Service Provider, with the further
limitations discussed in the next deﬁnition of R;
• R  xy + s, with the condition that xy + s < n, or in other words that the
computation of R using non modular arithmetic results equal to that using arith-
mentic modulo n; this can be for instance guaranteed by imposing x <
√
(n/2),
y <
√
(n/2), and z < n/2;
• B ∈ Z∗n: random blind factor generated by the user, with B−1 being its inverse
modulo n;
• H: a one way hash function, such as Im(H) ⊆ Znp
Unless otherwise speciﬁed, all the following operations are modulo n. The follow-
ing handshake relies on the double homomorphic property of the Discrete Logarithm
hashing. For any two values X1 and X2 it is:
(
aX1
)X2 = aX1·X2
aX1 · aX2 = aX1+X2
These properties allow the user to perform an homomorphic computation of R,
hence without getting to know the actual value R. In fact, given three values x,
y and s so that R = xy + s, it is (ay)x · as = axy+s = aR. Moreover, the supple-
mentary conditions on the random values x, y, s imply that the ordinary algebraic
computation of xy+s, as occurring as exponent of a, coincides with that performed
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in modulo n. This is inserted in the signature handshake as follows.
SP → User : ay (1)
User : (ay)xas = aR (2.1)
sign(R,P ) = H(aR‖P )dp mod np (2.2)
User → SP : x1 = Bex (3.1)
x2 = Be (sign(R,P ) + s) (3.2)
SP : x1y = Bexy (4.1)
x2+x1y = Be (sign(R,P )+s+xy) = Be (sign(R,P )+R) (4.2)
SP → User : (x2 + x1y)d = B [sign(R,P ) + R]d (5)
As a result, after removing the blinding factor (through modular multiplication
with B−1) in the message received at step (5) the user obtains the signed autho-
rization credential
cred =
[(
H(aR‖P )dp mod np
)
+ R
]d
The user can now compute R as
R = crede −
(
H(aR‖P )dp mod np
)
where the second term was earlier computed at step (2.2).
4.2 Authorization credential veriﬁcation
The above authorization credential, constructed at registration time, will be veriﬁed
later on at access time. Veriﬁcation is straightforward and consists in the following
steps:
• the user presents the pseudonym certiﬁcate P , which is veriﬁed through an usual
challenge-response handshake;
• the user then presents the pair (cred, R), and speciﬁes which service S is the
authorization credential valid for;
• the SP computes H(aR‖P ) and veriﬁes, using the RSA public key e associated
to S, and the RSA public key ep associated to P , that
(crede −R)ep = H(aR‖P )
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4.3 Discussion
The detailed security analysis of the proposed signature mechanism is outside the
goals of the present paper, and it is object of work in progress. Some preliminary
considerations follow, with the double goal of i) understanding the rationale behind
the proposed approach, and ii) describing how the proposed approach is devised to
defend against some simple forgeability and traceability attacks. In the following
discussion we assume that the communication channel is secure and the communi-
cating peers authenticated (i.e. no MITM attacks).
The transmission of the server side random value y occurs at step (1). Due to the
discrete logarithm hashing, it is computationally hard for the user to obtain y. Note
that this random value must remain unknown to the user during the handshake
as, otherwise, it would be trivial for the user to forge a value R′ and vanish the
desired properties of this signature mechanism. This would be obtained by sending
x1 = Bey−1x′ and x2 = Be
[(
H(ax
′+s′‖P )dp mod np
)
+ s′
]
thus embedding in the
credential an arbitrarily chosen value R′ = x′ + s′.
Step (2.1) consists in the homomorphic computation of R on the user side.
Unforgeability of R is provided by the usage of modulo n in the Discrete Logarithm,
and therefore by the anticollision properties of the DL-hashing discussed in [23],
whose security is proven to be equivalent to the factorization of n. The term aR
so computed is prepended to the pseudonym certiﬁcate P , and the result is hashed
and signed with the pseudonym certiﬁcate private key (step 2.2).
Step (3) consists in the blind transmission of both the user random value x as
well as the previously signed hash. Note that a second random number s is here
added to the result, to prevent that the elimination of the blinding factor Be, e.g.
through (x2 + x1y)/(x1y), results in a term including only R which could hence be
used to trace the subsequent access.
We remark that the security of the system requires the SP to explicitly include,
inside the signature, its own computed version of the random value R, to prevent
the user from forging R at will. This computation is blindly carried out in step
(4.2). Since this computation occurs with modulo n arithmetics, to guarantee that
the user computation of R (occurring with ordinary arithmetic) coincides with the
service provider computation we restrict the value R to result lower than n through
appropriate restrictions on the randomly generated values x, y, z.
Furthermore, we remark that step (4) is speciﬁcally designed to include R as a
modular addendum, and for this reason two blinded messages are sent. It can be
argued that a multiplicative insertion of R in the signature could have been trivially
achieved with just a single blinded message, but this would have in fact lead to an
universally forgeable signature.
Finally, forgeability of the access credential is prevented by the one-way prop-
erties of the chosen hash function. Speciﬁcally, to include in a previously signed
credential c a new value R¯ chosen by the user, it is necessary to ﬁnd a value R¯ which
satisﬁes the following condition:
(
ce − R¯)ep = H(aR¯|P ) mod np
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which is prevented by the anticollision properties of the properly chosen hash func-
tion.
5 Implementation issues and choices
5.1 Assumptions on lower layers
In the previous description, we have assumed that security services are provided
by the layers below the proposed application to guarantee a secure communication
channel and authenticated peers to prevent Man In The Middle attacks. We now
provide a more precise list of assumptions concerning the underlying communica-
tion.
(i) Encryption: All data exchanges within our system are protected by datagram
encryption. Employing TLS and IPSec and their support for oﬀ-the-shelf
advanced key management and encryption means ensure robustness against
crypto analysis attacks.
(ii) Server/Message Authentication: Relying on standard protocols (such as EAP-
TLS, EAP-TTLS, TLS including the pseudonym certiﬁcate for user authenti-
cation - see also the following discussion concerning our TLS implementation)
guarantees a strong protection against common attacks such as MITM and
Rougue Servers, preventing message modiﬁcation and tagging.
(iii) IP Natting / Anonymous networking : Employing an Anomymous Proxy (lo-
cated inside a domain not managed by the user ISP) having IP Natting func-
tionalities, or using Mix networks such as Tor [24] prevents users from being
linked by any Server which could simply bind diﬀerent pseudonyms/credentials
to the same IP address.
(iv) Safe Key Storage: All the users’ and servers’ private keys must be safely stored.
5.2 Implementation issues
Special care must be placed to the timing of the various procedures. For instance,
it would be preferable to use the SP as a ﬁnal element of a CA chain since it would
release the ﬁnal pseudonym P to be used later on for accessing the oﬀered service.
However, this would lead to possible correlation attacks devised to link the time at
which a pseudonym is released, and the subsequent time in which the user registers
and exposes its real identity.
5.3 Current implementation choices
A complete implementation of the current version of the SPARTA framework is
available online 6 . The current implementation is based on RSA, with 2048 bit keys,
and on the X.509v3 standard for digital certiﬁcates. The SPARTA Software Library
6 All the software developed is released under GPL License and is available for downloading at http:
//www.ist-discreet.org together with an online demo.
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is based on the OpenSSL Crypto library [25] for eﬃcient certiﬁcates generation and
management. Speciﬁc functions have been further implemented for the Marked
Blind Signature, by extending the sub-libraries provided by OpenSSL.
An integrated implementation approach has been followed. Rather than imple-
menting each diﬀerent server as a separate entity, a general Multi Purpose Server
(MPS) integrates the server side logic for the pseudonym assignment handshake (sec-
tion 3) as well as the authorization credential issuing handshake (section 4). The
MPS is implemented as a multithreaded server thus allowing the management of
several clients in parallel without signiﬁcant performance impairments. The server
stores the transactions log in a back-end database. We used the MySQL database
[26], which is well known by the open software community and guarantees good
performances while processing logs of many concurrent clients. On the user side,
we developed a Pseudonym Manager tool to assist the user through the various
token/pseudonym assignment, registration and veriﬁcation procedures. We choose
to develop a command-line tool, for ease of integrability in other softwares, with
a GUI commander for standalone user friendly operation. As regards the creden-
tial veriﬁcation at the time of service provisioning we also developed a standalone
command-line veriﬁcation tool, with the intent of being easily integrable in the logic
of the service application.
Concerning exchanged messages, we have deﬁned a common unique format.
Speciﬁcally, we have decided to employ an Attribute-Value pair format similar to
the one used in Radius/Diameter. The message is therefore composed by three
ﬁelds: i) a type ﬁeld which speciﬁes the type of message; ii) a length ﬁeld with
deﬁnes its size, and iii) a value ﬁeld that contains the delivered information. A
variety of message types have been speciﬁed (client hello, server hello, delivery of
the various certiﬁcates previously introduced, key requests, etc) for the registration
and veriﬁcation procedure. Further speciﬁc message types are introduced to support
the web service implementation version presented in section 5.4.
All the messages are conveyed over TCP sockets. As discussed in section 5.1, we
assume the presence of an underlying security protocol to secure all the communi-
cations, and our implementation choice was TLS, mostly for ease of implementation
and the possibility to deploy the proposed solution in a web service scenario (section
5.4).
In the current implementation, all the public/private key pairs are generated at
the user terminal side. Such a decision is due to both security and performance
reasons. For what concerns security, the fact that a private key for a token or
pseudonym certiﬁcate is never released by the end user prevents the possibility
to use rogue IR servers in order to steal the token/pseudonym certiﬁcate private
key, i.e. ultimately steal the user identity. Clearly proper storage of the private
keys is mandatory and delegated to oﬀ-the-shelf software key-rings. Regarding
performance, we have measured the time needed to generate a 2048 bit key pair on
an entry-level laptop (e.g. Intel Centrino 1.6GHz with 512MB RAM). This time
results in about 1 second, which is tolerable on the user side, but which might
become a performance bottleneck if implemented on a server side, especially when
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scalability is aimed at.
5.4 Example service scenario: web portal
An example service scenario has been developed as a web portal. An user is able
to login by submitting a valid pseudonym certiﬁcate (instead of a username), and
a valid authorization credential (instead of a password). It is worth to remark
that the pseudonym certiﬁcate submission is being integrated as client certiﬁcate
inside the TLS handshake. As such, pseudonym certiﬁcate veriﬁcation is directly
provided inside the TLS operation. To date we have not ﬁnd a way to include
the authorization credential veriﬁcation inside TLS (we believe that this requires
modiﬁcation to the TLS standard, through addition of a speciﬁc supplementary
message). Therefore, the submission of the authorization credential is prompted by
the web portal, after the establishment of the TLS connection and the visualization
of the portal home page. A credential veriﬁcation tool is then executed: it is
invoked as a Unix system call by a PHP script which implements the web portal
application. Using X.509v3 standard for digital certiﬁcates, an user is able to store
her pseudonym and her private key inside her browser using PKCS#12 (Personal
Information Exchange Syntax Standard) and can protect her private key within the
embedded browser key-ring.
5.5 Ongoing implementation work
The implementation of policy-based decisions on the token/pseudonym certiﬁcates
will follow as a next step. As anticipated in section 3, the token/pseudonym cer-
tiﬁcate veriﬁcation is not limited to signature veriﬁcation, but explicitly includes
a policy check, which is missing in the current implementation. Indeed, this is a
key feature for a viable practical deployment of our proposed approach to allow the
integration of services characterized by diﬀerent policies and regulatory provisions.
We are also working to extend the web service scenario. Indeed, integrating
SPARTA components into web-based applications brings about a series of advan-
tages. First, employing user’s pseudonym certiﬁcates inside the TLS handshake
for connection security and certiﬁcate veriﬁcation will speed up software perfor-
mance. Second, web applications are intrinsically user friendly, cross platform, and
accessible to a wider scope of users. To this purpose, current work consists in the
integration of the user-side Pseudonym Manager as a plug-in of a widely used pub-
lic domain web browser (for instance, as done by the Higgins project [27] Firefox
plugin), and improve the integration of the current server-side functionalities into
web-based applications and in the TLS protocol.
Finally, SPARTA is being extended to support anonymous payments and real-
time accounting. The idea is to generalize the use of the marked blind signature
as authorization tool non only for pseudonym certiﬁcates, but also for anonymized
payment-related certiﬁcates.
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6 Conclusion
In this paper we proposed a framework for user pseudonymization with service
authorization. The main novelties this paper introduces are i) a fully distributed
PKI-like user centric infrastructure for pseudonym assignment, ii) a system that
works with the absence of a trusted third party and ﬁnally iii) a novel blind signature
approach to provide a valid credential for service authorization to a user pseudonym.
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